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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-PRESIDENT'S ATTEMPT UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER TO REMOVE PRESIDENTIALLY APPROVED CAB ORDER FROM
SCOPE OF THE WATERMAN DOCTRINE

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Five domestic airlines' petitioned for judicial review of a Presidentially approved Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) decision
awarding a new international airline route 2 to a domestic carrier.
The Board, reversing an earlier administrative recommendation,3
chose American Airlines, Inc., to service this new international
route. 4 Pursuant to a statute' requiring Presidential affirmation of

such Board orders, President Ford approved the Board's decision
and added a disclaimer as required by Executive Order No.
1. The petitioners were: Braniff Airways, Inc.; Continental Airlines, Inc.;
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.; Trans World Airlines, Inc.; and Ozark Airlines, Inc.
2. The United States and Canada agreed that, beginning on April 25, 1976, a
United States airline would have the right to operate the Chicago-Montreal route,
which was one of the new airline routes established by the two countries in an
agreement made on May 5, 1974, amending the earlier bilateral Air Transport
Agreement. Agreement Amending Air Transport Agreement, May 8, 1974, United
States-Canada, 25 U.S.T. 748, T.I.A.S. No. 7824. See Air Transport Agreement,
January 17, 1966, United States-Canada, 17 U.S.T. 201, T.I.A.S. No. 5972.
3. After amending the Air Transport Agreement, see note 2 supra, the Board,
on June 11, 1975, started the Chicago-Montreal Route Proceeding to consider the
need for such a route and, if needed, which carrier would receive the route. CAB
Order 75-6-55, Docket 27932, Joint Appendix at 18, 21. An Administrative Law
Judge recommended that the route be given to Trans World Airlines, Inc. Recommended Decision of Administrative Law Judge Frank M. Whiting, Docket 27932,
Feb. 27, 1976, Joint Appendix at 108, 130, 149.
4. The Board's decision concerned the new Chicago-Montreal airline route.
Chicago-Montreal Route Proceeding [1976] 2 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 22, 224.
5. The statute, § 801 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1461(a) (Supp. V 1975), states that:
The issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension, or
revocation of, and the terms, conditions, and limitations contained in, any
certificate authorizing an air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air
transportation, . . . , shall be subject to the approval of the President.
Copies of all applications in respect of such certificates and permits shall
be transmitted to the President by the Board before hearing thereon, and
all decisions thereon by the Board shall be submitted to the President
before publication thereof.
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11,920.6 Following the disclaimer procedure established by this
Executive Order,7 the President asserted that no defense or foreign
policy implications affected his approval.' Petitioners then challenged the Board's order by petitioning the instant court for judicial review. Intervenor, American Airlines, Inc., moved to dismiss
the petition by arguing that the Waterman doctrine9 precluded
judicial review on the merits of the Board's decision.'0 Petitioners
responded that the Presidential disclaimer removed the Waterman
impediment to the instant court's statutory review authority." On
petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, dismissed. 2 Held: The Waterman doctrine precludes judicial review on the merits of a Presidentially approved
order of the Civil Aeronautics Board despite an accompanying
Presidential disclaimer of any underlying defense or foreign policy
considerations, written according to the procedures established by
an Executive Order to facilitate judicial review. Braniff Airways,
Inc. v. CAB [Chicago-Montreal], 581 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
6. Executive Order No. 11,920, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1977), establishes executive
branch procedures to facilitate Presidential review of Board decisions submitted
under 49 U.S.C. § 1461(a). President Ford approved the order on November 4,
1976 and the Board issued the order on November 8, 1976, with an effective date
of January 7, 1977. Joint Appendix at 30, 47. On November 6, 1977, the Board
issued a second order which denied requests for reconsideration of the decisions
made in the order and refused to stay the order. Joint Appendix at 51, 70.
7. See notes 27-29 infra, and text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
8. The President's approval order stated: "The issues presented in this proceeding are not affected by any substantial defense or foreign policy considerations, and no defense or foreign policy considerations underlie my decision." Joint
Appendix at 50.
9. See text accompanying notes 13-18 infra.
10. But see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB [Chicago-Montreal], 581 F.2d 846,
852, n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1978), where the instant court stated that American's pleading was styled as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
11. The instant court's alleged statutory authority is found in 49 U.S.C. §
1486(a) (1970), which states that:
Any order, .

. . ,

issued by the Board ... under this chapter, except any

order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the
President as provided in section 1461 of this title, shall be subject to review
by the courts of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upon petition, ....

by any person

disclosing a substantial interest in such order . ...
12. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB [Chicago-Montreal],581 F.2d 846, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Although American's pleading was styled as a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, the court based its holding on the fact that the merits of
such orders are nonreviewable. Id. at 852, n.20.
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11.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 3 the Court interpreted the language used in the exception
clause of 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970) .14 The exception clause states
that "[a]ny order,

. . .

, except any order in respect of any foreign

air carrier subject to the approval of the President as provided in
Section 1461 [(a)] of this title, shall be subject to review . ... ,
Section 1461(a)16 presently provides that certificates issued by the
Board authorizing an air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air
transportation shall be subject to Presidential approval. The Court
in Waterman stated that the exception clause in Section 1486(a)
includes Board orders concerning overseas or international air
routes assigned to domestic air carriers subject to the President's
approval under § 1461(a), in addition to foreign air carriers. 7 In the
Waterman doctrine, the Court held that judicial review does not
exist for such Board orders either before or after Presidential approval."5 The Court reasoned that the judiciary could not review
such orders since they involve political Executive decisions concerning foreign policy and "[t]he judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities, nor responsibility .

.

." for such decisions.'" The

Waterman dissent, however, warned that the majority's broad
holding would preclude judicial review of an unlawful action of the
Board subsequently approved by the President." Succeeding ap13. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). In Waterman, the Board, with the President's approval, issued an order denying the Waterman Steamship Corporation a certificate of convenience and necessity for overseas and foreign air routes and instead
granted one to Chicago and Southern Air Lines, a rival applicant. Id. at 105.
14. At the time of the Waterman decision, § 1461(a) was part of § 1006 of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. § 646(a) (1946). The language in § 646(a) has
not been significantly changed by § 1461(a). For full text of § 1461(a), see note 5
supra.
15. 49 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (Supp. V 1975).
16. For a more complete text of § 1486(a), see note 11 supra.
17. Waterman, 333 U.S. at 114. Many writers feel that the language in §
1461(a) was not intended to be applied to anything more than foreign air carriers
operating by permit. See, e.g., Miller, The Waterman Doctrine Revisited, 54
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 5, 9 (1965). Congress has not, however, changed the
language of § 1461(a), even when it added a new subsection, 1461(b), in 1975.
18. Waterman, 333 U.S. at 114.
19. Id. at 111. The court also reasoned that to revise or review an administrative decision before the decision reached the President for approval would be
equivalent to rendering an improper advisory opinion. Id. at 113.
20. Id. at 117-18. The minority stated that: "Presidential approval cannot
make valid invalid orders of the Board. His approval supplements rather than
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pellate court decisions have generally followed the Waterman
holding.2 The post-Waterman cases offer guidance on three issues. 2 First, judicial review will not be given to claims of denials
of procedural due process by the Board's actions.? Second, judicial
review will not be given to questions of substantial evidence, and
other related questions which apply to the merits of a Presidentially approved Board order. 24 Third, in American Airlines v.
CAB,21 the court created an exception to the Waterman doctrine
by holding that judicial review will be given to questions concerning the statutory authority of the Board's actions, notwithstanding
Presidential approval of the Board's order.26 In 1977, the executive
supersedes Board action. Only when the Board has acted within the limits of its
authority has the basis been laid for the issuance of certificates." Id. at 116.
21. The first case specifically following Waterman was Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 941 (1951),
where the court held that since both the President and the Board had acted within
their legal powers in making the order, the Waterman doctrine precluded judicial
review of that order.
22. Miller, supra note 17, at 22.
23. This guideline was first expressed in the case of United States Overseas
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 222 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where the court held
that despite the petitioner's claims of procedural irregularity in the Board's decision, under the Waterman decision the court has no jurisdiction to review orders
of the Board in matters which by statute are for the determination of the President.
24. American Airlines v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
25. Id. The court in American Airlines was asked to review whether the Board
had the authority to revise its regulations governing charter flights in overseas and
foreign air transportation to allow supplemental air carriers to operate split charters. Id. at 351. Split charters occur when one half of a plane's capacity is chartered
to each of two eligible groups, neither of which can fill the entire aircraft. Miller,
supra note 17.
26. The court reasoned that: "Clearly Waterman presupposes lawfully exercised congressional authority in the Board's action, in the first instance, as an
indispensable predicate, without which there is nothing Presidential action can
approve." American Airlines, 348 F.2d at 352.
The American Airlines holding had first been stated in dicta of British Overseas
Airways Corp. v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In British Overseas,
the court stated that despite its holding that Waterman did not authorize review
in this case, such a holding did not preclude a judicial remedy for administrative
or Presidential action beyond the scope of lawful authority, as defined by the
Aviation Act. Cf. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 321
F.2d 394, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (court vacated as premature a declaratory judgment by the district court which held certain Board action to lack statutory
authority).
See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1967).
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branch issued Executive Order No. 11,920,2 establishing procedures for Presidential review of Board decisions submitted under
§ 1461, in order to silence criticism of the manner in which international airline route decisions had been previously handled by the
executive branch. 2 According to the Executive Order, the President may include in his approval letter a disclaimer asserting that
no foreign policy or defense considerations have entered into his
decision. 29 The disclaimer's purpose is to enable the courts to have
every opportunity under the law to review the merits of a Presidentially approved Board order." Executive Order 11,920, coupled
with the exception to the Waterman doctrine introduced by the
American Airlines case, created the conflict with the Waterman
doctrine which the instant court attempts to resolve.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant decision, after initially determining that sections
1461(a) and 1486(a) 31 covered the Board's order in issue, the court
analyzed petitioners' three arguments. First, petitioners argued
that the instant court ought not follow the often criticized five-tofour vote Waterman decision. 32 The court answered by noting the
many unsuccessful Congressional attempts to limit or overrule
Waterman.33 Second, petitioners argued that subsequent cases
See also Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483, 493 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (when the Board acts outside its statutory authority with respect to a
foreign, not domestic, air carrier, and the Board's order is approved by the President under § 1461(a), judicial review is expressly precluded by the language of §

1486(a), and thus is not covered by the American Airlines exception to the
Waterman doctrine).

27. 3 C.F.R. 121 (1977).
28. Critics charged that domestic political and economic considerations,
rather than national defense and foreign policy considerations had become dominant factors in most route selection approvals. See Whitney, Integrity of Agency
JudicialProcess Under the FederalAviation Act: The Special Problem Posed by
InternationalAirline Route Awards, 14 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 787, 796-801 & n.
62 (1973); Note, Section 801 of the FederalAviation Act-The President & the
Award of InternationalAir Routes to Domestic Carriers:A Proposalfor Change,
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 517, 523, 527-33 (1970).
29. 3 C.F.R. at 122.
30. Id. at 122-23.
31. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 849.
32. Id. See Miller, supra note 17; Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the PresidentParticipates,74 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1961).
33. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 849 n.12. Despite the fact that the court's answer did
not correlate in the text of the opinion to the petitioner's argument, the court felt
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have limited and distinguished the scope of the Waterman decision.34 The court replied that the instant case did not fit within the
scope of the American Airlines exception" to the Waterman doctrine since the petitioners had attacked the merits of the Board's
decision." Third, addressing the main issue of the case, the petitioners argued" that the Waterman doctrine did not govern the
instant case because the President had inserted a disclaimer in his
approval of the Board's order. 8 The petitioners noted that, by
disclaiming any underlying foreign policy or defense considerations
relevant to his decision, the President had followed the procedures
established in Executive Order 11,920, thereby entitling the judiciary to review the merits of his decision." According to petitioners,
the President's disclaimer removed any impediment to judicial
review since the Waterman doctrine could be applied only to
"[flinal orders [that] embody Presidential discretion as to political matters beyond the competence of the courts to adjudicate." 0
The instant court replied that the President cannot create judicial
review authority4' and, in the instant case, the President had imthat if Congress had wanted to change the Waterman doctrine, such action would
have been taken previously. Also, the court noted that in 1972 the Congress added
a new subsection to Section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1461(b)
(Supp. V 1975). Section 1461(b) provides that the President may disapprove
certain actions regarding rates, fares, and charges in foreign transportation only
for the reasons of national defense or foreign policy. 49 U.S.C. § 1461(b) (Supp.
V 1975). The court noted that the amendment left § 1461(a) untouched, which
was the original language used as a statutory basis for the Waterman decision.
See Braniff, 581 F.2d at 849 n.12.
34. Id. at 849.
35. See text accompanying notes 24 to 26 supra.
36. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 849-50. The instant court also restated the lines in
American Airlines, 348 F.2d at 352, which echoed the Waterman holding: "[t]he
President must be free to consider broad 'evidentiary' policy factors not involved,
and indeed not relevant, in Board proceedings and ...

the President must be

free to exercise unreviewable discretion as to the weight to be given to such
extrajudicial factors." Braniff, 581 F.2d at 850.
37. The petitioners were joined in this argument by the United States as an
intervenor.
38. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 850.
39. Executive Order 11,920, 3 C.F.R. at 122, requires agencies to forward to
the White House reports stating the defense or foreign policy considerations of the
Board decision under review, in order that the President might consider including
in his letter of approval a disclaimer such as is presented in the instant case.
40. Waterman, 333 U.S. at 114.
41. The court, in making the reply, cited the American Airlines case, 348 F.2d
at 351.
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properly attempted to create such authority.2 Moreover, the court
reasoned that a judicial decision on the merits of the instant case
would result in an impermissible advisory opinion. The advisory
opinion results from a subsequent remand to the Board 3 and then,
pursuant to § 1461(a), Presidential consideration of the Board's
subsequent decision. Also, the instant court felt that the potential
for political abuse remained since the Executive Order had no
procedure requiringthe President to issue a disclaimer in all cases
devoid of foreign policy or defense considerations." The potential
for political abuse remained as long as the President's choice of
attaching a disclaimer determined the allowability of judicial review. 5 The court also expressed its skepticism that any award of
an international air route could be entirely free of foreign policy
and defense considerations. Thus, according to the court, the President's disclaimer had no basis in fact." In addition, the court
stated that notice should be taken of Congress' potentially opposite view of the President's belief concerning the absence of underlying foreign policy or defense considerations because Congress had
originally granted the President's special authority to review the
Board's award of international air routes." Consequently, the instant court dismissed the petitions for review and granted the intervenor's motion to dismiss" because the Waterman doctrine precludes judicial review despite a Presidential disclaimer issued according to Executive Order No. 11,920.
42. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 850-51.
43. Id. The instant court cited Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409, 411 (1792).
44. The court examined Executive Order No. 11,920, and found the following
appended statement:
In a case involving a "routine" approval of an order with respect to a
foreign or overseas certificate of a U.S. carrier, i.e., one not based on any
foreign policy or defense objectives, the President may indicate that he
would have no objection to judicial review of the CAB decision and proceeding.
Braniff, 581 F.2d at 851-52 (quoting from Joint Appendix at 961, 962) (emphasis
added). See text accompanying note 29 supra.
45. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 852.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court quoted extensively from sections of President Ford's approval letter, and interpreted his words as implicitly showing that general foreign
policy considerations, including both balance of payments and competitive opportunity, had been relevant to each of the stages leading to the ultimate award.
Moreover, the court found a variation of the above theme in a letter from President Carter to the Board Chairman dated April 22, 1977. Id.
48. Id.
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COMMENT

The instant result follows the line of cases prior to the American
Airlines exception, which consistently employed the Waterman
doctrine to preclude judicial review of Board orders submitted to
the President under § 1461(a).11 Prior to the instant case, the rationale of the Waterman doctrine indicated that such Board orders
contained foreign policy and defense considerations which the
courts lacked competence to review.50 The instant result ostensibly
expands the scope of the Waterman doctrine to include a prohibition of judicial review of a Board order despite a Presidential disclaimer asserting that no foreign policy or defense considerations
underlie the decision. The instant court's reasoning,5 ' however,
does not justify the expansion of the Waterman doctrine in this
manner. When President Ford stated in his approval letter that no
foreign policy or defense considerations affected his decision to
approve the Board's order, 2 the instant case no longer truly fit
within the Waterman doctrine. 3 By skeptically questioning the
absence of such considerations54 underlying the award of an international air route, the instant court clearly substitutes its opinion
on such matters for that of the President. Moreover, the instant
court's prohibition of review on the basis that Congress may differ
with the President's opinion concerning justifications for the use
of the disclaimer 5 rests upon a weak foundation. Congress can
rescind its statutory delegation of Presidential review authority
given by § 1461(a) should Congress disagree with the President's
decision to use the disclaimer. The instant court, though, despite
its faulty reasoning, achieved the correct result because a contrary
holding would have given the President freedom to personally select judicially reviewable cases." This unchecked freedom of choice
49.
50.
51.
52.

See text accompanying notes 12 to 26 supra.
Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
See text accompanying notes 27 to 48 supra.
See note 8 supra for the text of the disclaimer in the approval letter.

53. See note 22 to 26 supra.
The President has the power to change the Board's order after the order has
been submitted to him for approval under § 1461(a). Waterman, 333 U.S. at 109.

This is one of the few instances where the President and his aides expressly
determine, rather than coordinate an agency's decisionmaking procedure. W.
137-38 (6th ed. 1974).

GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

54. Braniff, 581 F.2d at 852.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 851.
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results from the executive order's procedures which state that the
President may include a disclaimer in cases lacking foreign policy
or defense considerations.5 7 Possibilities of political corruption
exist with the freedom of choice given to the President by the
Executive Order. 58 Furthermore, such a choice will allow the President to personally create judicial review authority. 9 Also, the instant court correctly states that judicial review given after the
President has allowed the review would result in an impermissible
advisory decision."0 The court's decision becomes advisory because
the case will again go back to the Board and to the President.
Therefore, the instant court could have written a stronger opinion
by justifying the instant holding solely on the ground of the unchecked freedom of choice given to the President by Executive
Order 11,920.1 By amending Executive Order 11,920 to require the
issuance of a disclaimer should the President find no foreign policy
or defense considerations present in the Board's order, judicial
review authority will exist under the Waterman doctrine as the
scope of the doctrine existed prior to the instant case. In spite of
the instant court's holding, future courts may still have judicial
review authority because of the faulty reasoning used by the instant court. Courts in future cases under an amended Executive
Order can balance the competing policy arguments concerning the
propriety of expanding the scope of the Waterman doctrine to
cover cases involving Presidentially approved Board orders lacking
foreign policy or defense considerations.
James A. Walker
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
Braniff, 581 F. 2d at 852.
Id. at 851-52.
Id. at 851.
Id.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-TRADEMARK RIGHTS-COURT OF
JUSTICE PREVENTS THIRD PARTY FROM AFFIXING TRADEMARK TO
GOODS SOLD UNDER ANOTHER MARK

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Pending resolution of a trademark dispute between two pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Rotterdam District Court' requested
a ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Economic Communities (Court) 2 interpreting article 36 of the European Economic
Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) .3 Plaintiff4 had petitioned 5 the
district court for a ruling that it was entitled to market a drug6 in
the Netherlands under defendant's Benelux 7 trademark, although

the drug was initially sold by defendant in the United Kingdom
under a different mark. Defendant marketed' the drug9 in the
1.
2.

The Arrondissementsrechtbank at Rotterdam, Netherlands.
The Court may decide all issues arising under the EEC Treaty, including

disputes between member states about their duties under that treaty. A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 188-91 (3d ed. 1973).
3. Article 36 provides:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to
prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit
which are justified on grounds of public moraltiy, public order, public
safety, the protection of human or animal life or health, the preservation
of plant life, the protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or
archaeological value or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute either
a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, [1958]
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 29 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
4. Plaintiff, Centrafarm B.V., is a Netherlands corporation which manufactures and markets pharmaceutical products.
5. Plaintiff sought a declaratory opinion that its marketing plan was lawful.
Defendant counterclaimed that plaintiff had infringed the trademark rights of the
defendant. Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Products Corp., [1978-81 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, 1825, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP.

(CCH) 8475, at 8581.
6. The drug oxazepamum is classified in the Benelux trademark register as a
tranquilizing, sedative and antispasmodic preparation. Id. at 1825, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT.

REP. (CCH)

at 8580.

7. The Benelux is an economic union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, formed pursuant to the Treaty Instituting the Benelux Economic Union,
Feb. 3, 1958, [19601 381 U.N.T.S. 165.

8. Defendant, American Home Products Corporation, is the United States
parent corporation of John Wyeth & Brothers Ltd. Wyeth actually manufactures
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United Kingdom under the trademark Serenid D and in the Netherlands under the trademark Seresta. Defendant counterclaimed
for trademark infringement maintaining in part'0 that Benelux law
did not sanction the unauthorized alteration of another's mark.
Plaintiff contended that the use of separate marks for virtually
identical products artificially partitioned" the market between
member states in violation of article 36. The District Court temporarily enjoined further marketing of the repackaged drug and referred" the EEC Treaty issue to the Court. Held: The proprietor
of a trademark may prevent an unauthorized third party from
repackaging under that mark the same product sold by the proprietor under another mark, unless the proprietor markets his product
under separate marks for the purpose of artificially partitioning
the market. Centrafarm B. V. v. American Home Products
Corporation, [1978-8] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1977-78
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8475.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The conflict between the free movement of goods among the
and sells oxazepamum in the United Kingdom under the defendant's trademark
[1978-81 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1825, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] CoMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) at 8580.

9. Oxazepamum is the active constituent of each of defendant's two trademarked compounds. Each compound has an identical therapeutic effect, but they
differ in taste and composition. Medical preparations are not considered to be
different unless the therapeutic effect differs. Preliminary Ruling, Ex parte Adriaan de Peijper, [19761 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 613, [1976 Transfer Binder]
Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8353. For this reason, the Court considered this case
as involving a single drug compound.
10. Defendant also charged plaintiff with affixing the defendant's mark to
oxazepamum not manufactured by the defendant. The Court, however, accepted
the plaintiffs version of the facts. Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Products
Corp., [1978-8] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1825, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) at 8581.
11. The market is partitioned when the proprietor of a trademark exercises
his right in a manner resulting in different prices in different countries for the
same product. This practice frustrates the basic policy of the EEC Treaty: to
create a single market free of artificial barriers to trade. See Commission of
European Communities v. Ger. (W.), [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1975
Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8293.
12. Under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the courts of member states may
refer treaty interpretation questions to the Court for a ruling. The national court
then decides the case in light of the ruling. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at 76-77.
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member states of the Common Market'3 and the protection of
trademark, copyright and patent rights has provided a continuing
source of litigation in the Court. Article 30 of the EEC Treaty
prohibits all quantitative restrictions on imports'4 except those
prohibitions or restrictions specifically allowed.' 5 In Parke, Davis
8 the Court held that the assertion of
& Co. v. Centrafarm,'
a commercial or industrial property right did not violate the EEC
Treaty, which permits justifiable import restrictions necessary to
protect the specific subject matter of the property.' 7 The Court in
Parke analyzed the right asserted and allowed enforcement consistent with the policies'" which the right was designed to effectuate.
Thus, in Centrafarm v. Winthrop,'" the Court prevented the holder
of a Dutch trademark from blocking importation into the Netherlands of goods legally trademarked and sold in England because
such a practice would not promote the trademark policy of assuring the consumer of the product's origin. 0 The Winthrop Court
asserted that protecting the proprietor of the mark would artifi13. The terms "Common Market" and "Market" are used interchangeably
with the term "EEC."
14. EEC Treaty, article 30, provides: "Quantitative restrictions on importation and all measures with equivalent effect shall .

.

. be prohibited between

Member States." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at 26.
15. Id. at 26-30.
16. [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 81, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CoMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
8054.
17. See Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., Preliminary Ruling, [1974]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8246; Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G., Preliminary Ruling, [1974] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8230.
18. Patent rights are designed to reward the creative effort of the inventor by
preventing unauthorized parties from misappropriating the inventor's product.
Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., Preliminary Ruling, [1974] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8236. Trademark
rights are designed to similarly protect the holder of the trademark and to protect
the consumer by assuring him of the product's origin. Hoffman-La Roche & Co.
v. Centrafarm, Preliminary Ruling, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [19771978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466.
19. Preliminary Ruling, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183, [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8247.
20. The Winthrop Court said in dicta that the trademark right allowed the
proprietor to prevent a third party from affixing the mark to another product
without authorization. Id. at 1194-95, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) at 9151-66. The Court construed the product origin guarantee as meaning
that the consumer was assured that all products bearing the mark were produced
by the same manufacturer.
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cially partition the market" without adequately preserving the
trademark from illegal infringement.2 2 This result is consistent
with a line of cases defining the scope of commercial and industrial
property rights according to a "consumer injury" standard.2 In
Commission v. Germany,2' 4 the Court held that the article 30 prohibition applies unless necessary "to ensure that the producer and
consumer are protected against fraudulent commercial practices."" This consumer injury standard arises from article 86 of the
EEC Treaty 6 which prohibits the abuse of a dominant market

position when such abuse affects trade between EEC member
states.27 The examples of abuse listed in article 8628 show that the
EEC Treaty was designed to stop those practices adversely affect21. See note 11 supra.
22. See generally Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., Preliminary Ruling, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1039, [1976
Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8362.
23. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm, Preliminary Ruling, [1978] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8466; ICI v. Commission of European Communities, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209; Europemballage Corp. v. Commission of European Communities, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171.
24. [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8293.
25. Id. at 191, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) at 7392.
26. Article 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at 48-49.
27. Europemballage Corp. v. Commission of European Communities, [19731
E.Comm. Ct J. Rep. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

8171.
28.

See note 26 supra.
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ing the market and injuring consumers and trading partners."
Thus, in Van Zuylen v. Hag,30 the Court refused to enforce a trademark right because enforcement would not necessarily assure the
consumer of the product's origin. In Hoffman-La Roche v.
Centrafarm,3 ' the defendant satisfied this product origin guarantee
when he reaffixed the plaintiff's trademark to a repackaged product initially marketed by the plaintiff.: The Court acknowledged
the plaintiff's right to prevent any use of the trademark likely to
impair the guarantee of origin, but held that the assertion of the
right under the circumstances3 constituted a disguised restriction
of trade.3 4 As such, the plaintiff's marketing scheme failed to meet
the consumer protection standard used by the Court to assess the
specific subject matter of the right asserted. 5 The erosion of trademark and other commercial rights thus continued as the Court
promoted the free movement of goods without indicating the circumstances in which the protection of commercial property rights
would control.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

After determining that the two marks had been applied to a
29. ICI v. Commission of European Communities, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209; Europemballage Corp. v. Commission of European Communities, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171.
30. [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731, [1974 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8230.
31. [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] ComM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466.
32. The plaintiff in Hoffman-La Roche had marketed the drug valium in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands at prices that differed substantially. The
defendant purchased the drug in the United Kingdom, repackaged it under the
original mark and sold it in the Netherlands at a price substantially lower than
the price charged by the plaintiff in the latter country.
33. The Court in Hoffman-La Roche noted that the exercise of the trademark
right would tend to partition the market, that repackaging did not adversely
affect the condition of the product, that the proprietor of the trademark was
notified of the repackaging and that the new package stated that the product had
been repackaged by the defendant.
34. See note 11 supra.
35. The Court also considered whether Hoffman-La Roche had abused its
dominant position in the market, see note 22 supra, holding that the exercise of
a right in conformity with article 36 is not contrary to article 86 if the right
asserted is not used to abuse a dominant position in the market.
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single product," the Court considered the effect of article 36 on
rights conferred by the trademark law of the importing nation. The
Court stated that the article 30 prohibition on import restrictions
does not preclude the protection of industrial and commercial
property rights." In addition, the Court noted that the article 36
exceptions apply only as justified to safeguard the specific subject
matter of the right asserted.38 The Court then stated that the purpose of a trademark is to guarantee the exclusive use of the mark
to the proprietor when he initially sells the product." This right
must be applied according to the essential function of the trademark, which is to assure the identity of origin to the consumer. 0
The instant Court construed this guarantee of origin to mean that
only the proprietor of the mark may determine the identity of the
product." The Court then found that plaintiff's unauthorized use
of the trademark abridged defendant's right to make that determination. Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant, as proprietor of the mark, could, under the first sentence of article 36, justifiably prevent plaintiff from affixing defendant's mark to goods lawfully sold by defendant under another mark. Fearing that the use
of separate trademarks for the same product might artificially partition the market,42 the Court remanded the case to the Rotterdam
district court for consideration of whether defendant had intended
to create such a partition. 3
36. This determination was based upon the lack of therapeutic differences
between the two drugs. Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Products Corp.,
[1978-8] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH)
8475. See note 9 supra.
37. See Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., Preliminary Ruling, [1974]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8246.
38. See Commission of European Communities v. Ger. (W.), [1975] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.REP. (CCH) 8293.
39. This guarantee protects the proprietor from persons who might illegally
affix the protected mark to other products to take advantage of the reputation of
the trademark.
40. See note 20 supra.
41. The Court reasoned that allowing a third party to affix the mark would
jeopardize the guarantee of origin. But see Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1139, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. 1 (CCH)
8466.
42. See note 11 supra.
43. The element of intent was not considered in previous cases which focused
instead upon whether or not a partition was created by the exercise of a particular
right. See generally Hoffman-La Roche, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1139,
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IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision curtailed the Hoffman-La Roche expansion
of free movement principles and deemphasized the role of the consumer protection standard in assessing trademark rights. The instant case is factually consistent with prior cases allowing an imorter great latitude in marketing goods under original trademark."
Thus, the Court probably will approve any marketing scheme
which uses the original trademark as long as the product remains
undamaged.45 The instant Court's rationale, however, departs from
the Hoffman-La Roche principle that the trademark operates primarily to enable the consumer to distinguish a given product from
products of different origin. The Court incorrectly applied the consumer protection standard because, when the two products in
question are identical" and are manufactured by the same company, there is no danger of consumer confusion.4" A better approach would be to examine the differences in the price and composition of the drug compounds and determine whether the marketing plan injures or benefits the ultimate consumer. Such an
approach comports with earlier cases which held that trademark
rights were designed primarily to protect the consumers from
fraudulent commercial practices.48 The instant Court indirectly
considered this consumer protection issue when it found that the
defendant's marketing arrangement might constitute a disguised
restriction of trade if the defendant intended to partition the market;49 however, by allowing an importer to claim inadvertence and
thereby escape liability, the protection previously given the consumer has been weakened in favor of more expansive trademark
rights. Therefore, this case gives notice that the rights of trademark holders will be protected in the EEC. This protection may
have a long-range consumer benefit of encouraging research and
development of new products; however, the Court should pay more
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8466.
44. See note 23 supra. Cf. Terrapin v. Terranova, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1039, [1976 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209 (prohibiting
the importation of goods bearing a trademark similar to the mark registered to
the plaintiff).
45. See note 33 supra.
46. See notes 9 & 36 supra & accompanying text.
47. As such, the dangers of confusion which the Court addressed in Terranova
seem non-existent.
48. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
49. See note 11 supra.
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attention to ensuring that the return on these products is gathered
equally from all consumers in the Common Market.
Charles Anthony Daughtrey

THE TREATY POWER-THE PROPERTY CLAUSE PERMITS THE
TRANSFER OF UNITED STATES PROPERTY THROUGH SELF-EXECUTING
TREATY

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellants, sixty members of the House of Representatives,
brought suit in federal district court seeking an order preventing
the transfer of United States properties, including the Panama
Canal, to the Republic of Panama through self-executing treaty.'
Appellants contended that Congress has exclusive authority under
3
the property clause 2 to dispose of United States property. Appellee
challenged the jurisdiction of federal courts to decide the case and
contended, in the alternative, that the Constitution permits
United States property to be disposed of by self-executing treaty.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding appellants lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate injury in
fact from appellee's invocation of the treaty process. On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
affirmed.4 Held: The property clause of the Constitution is not the
1. Article II, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States provides that the
President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to Make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur"; a selfexecuting treaty becomes law without'enacting legislation. Sometimes treaties
are drafted so that they require congressional action before they become legally
effective. Whether or not a given treaty is self-executing or requires enacting
legislation depends upon its terms. L. TRunE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 16768 (1978).
Two treaties, signed by the chief executives of Panama and the United States,
were presented to the Senate for ratification: the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, and the Panama Canal
Treaty, which contains the article conveying the Canal Zone properties to the
Republic of Panama. The Senate consented to the Neutrality Treaty on March
16, 1978; 124 CONG. REc. S3857 (daily ed. March 16, 1978). The Panama Canal
Treaty was approved on April 18, 1978; 124 CONG. REc. S5796 (daily ed. April 18,
1978).
2. The property clause of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or any particular State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
3. James Earl Carter, President of the United States.
4. The court decided the case on the merits without deciding jurisdictional
issues raised by appellee. See note 19 infra.
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exclusive method for disposing of federal property and does not
prohibit the transfer of federal property to foreign nations through
self-executing treaty. Edwards v. Carter,580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2240 (1978).
11.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The United States Constitution grants to the President the
power to make treaties, subject to approval by two-thirds of the
Senate. 5 The treaty power, although granted in broad terms, is
limited. The Supreme Court's recognition that a treaty must deal
with questions properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign
nation6 indicates that there are some restrictions inherent in the
treaty power. The treaty power, however, is more significantly limited by express constitutional restraints.7 Although the extent of
these constitutional limitations is unclear, it is generally recognized that a treaty may not exercise a power granted exclusively
to Congress.' No express exclusive power is granted to Congress in
the property clause,' but the selection of one branch to exercise the
power implies an exclusion of that power by the other two
branches. The records of the Constitutional Convention and state
ratifying conventions nevertheless indicate that at least some of
the delegates thought this power could be exercised through the
treaty process. During a debate at the Virginia state ratifying con5. See note 1 supra.
6. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258 (1890). In discussing the scope of the treaty power, the Court stated:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the
nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be
contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of
the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without
its consent . . . . But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there
&is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter
which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country. Id. at
267 (citation omitted).
7. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258
(1890); note 6 supra; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 117,
Comment d at 372 (1965); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 9496 (1972).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATONS LAW § 141(3) comment f
at 435 (1965).
9. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, reprinted at note 2 supra.
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vention, a delegate stated that the sole purpose of the clause was
to define the role of the central government in the disposition of
unsettled Western lands, and that it could not be construed as a
limitation on the treaty power. 0 Several amendments were offered
during the conventions which would have restricted the treaty
power by establishing special requirements for treaties ceding certain property rights. The records of the conventions do not show,
however, whether these proposals were rejected because the requirement of a concurrence by two-thirds of the Senate was
deemed sufficient to protect United States property rights, or because the property clause was interpreted as prohibiting such cessions. The courts have taken the position, in a variety of contexts,
that Congress has exclusive authority to dispose of federal property. This has been especially true in cases involving the division
of power between the federal government and the states. In determining that United States property is not subject to state taxation,
the Supreme Court stated in Wisconsin Cent. R.R. Co. v. Price
County 2 that "[Article IV] implies an exclusion of all other authority over the property which could interfere with this right [of
disposition] or obstruct its exercise.' 3 In contexts other than
10.

See 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-

(1907).
11. As originally reported to the Convention, authority to make treaties would
have been entrusted to a majority of tl~e Senate without Presidential participation. By September 4, 1787, the working draft of the Constitution provided: "The
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have power to
make Treaties"-"But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds
of the members present." On September 7, the Convention approved an amendment adding the words "(except treaties of Peace)" after the word "Treaty," and
rejected a proposal authorizing a concurrence of the President. On the same day
an amendment was proposed that would have required that "no Treaty of Peace
shall be entered into, whereby the United States shall be deprived of any of their
present Territory or rights without the concurrence of two thirds of the Members
of the Senate present." This amendment was defeated by adjournment without
discussion. Later, a proposal that would have provided for House participation
in such treaties was rejected. Similar amendments were offered and rejected in
the various state ratifying conventions. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 533-34, 540-49 (M. Farrand ed. 1937); 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 504-05

THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

500, 660 (1907); 4 id. at 115.
12. 133 U.S. 496 (1890).
13. Id. at 504. More recently the Court has stated that "The power of Congress
to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States is 'vested in
Congress without limitation."' Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954). See
also United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); Inter-
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state-federal relations, the courts also have indicated that the
power of Congress to dispose of property is unlimited.'4 No cases,
however, address the validity of a conveyance of United States
property to a foreign nation through a self-executing treaty. One
line of cases involving conveyances by the federal government to
Indian tribes suggests that United States property may be conveyed by treaty without congressional consent. In determining
the validity of a conveyance by treaty to a Cherokee tribe, the
Supreme Court noted in Holden v. Joy'5 that a treaty may convey

good title to such lands without an act of Congress. 6 Similarly, in
Jones v. Meehan," the Court stated that "Lilt is well settled that
a good title to parts of the lands of an Indian tribe may be granted
to individuals by a treaty between the United States and the tribe,
without any act of Congress, or any patent from the Executive
authority of the United States."' 8 The courts have concluded that
United States property rights were in fact conveyed, instead of
merely recognizing existing property rights of Indians." In Jones,
Island Co. v. Hawaii, 305 U.S. 306 (1938); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S.
278 (1909); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1871); Griffin v. United
States, 168 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1948).
14. See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 459, 468-69, 14 Pet. 526, 536-37, 647
(1840) (stating "congress has the same power over it as over any other property
belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in congress without
limitation; and has been considered the foundation upon which the territorial
governments rest."); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating: "Article IV, Section 3 of The United States Constitution commit's the management and control of the lands of the United States to Congress. That congressional power is unlimited." See also United States v. Fitzgerald, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
407 (1841).
15. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872).
16. The Supreme Court, however, did not use this constitutional ground for
the basis of its holding. The Court held, in effect, that Congress had ratified the
treaty since it had been effectuated and congressional enactments had repeatedly
recognized its validity. Id. at 247.
17. 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
18. Id. at 10. See also Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 241 (1906) (The Supreme Court stated "this court and the highest court of Michigan concur in
holding that a title in fee may pass by a treaty without the aid of an act of
Congress."
19. Defendant's counsel in Jones relied on an opinion of Attorney General
Taney, dated September 20, 1833, which stated: "these reservations are excepted
out of the grant made by the treaty, and did not therefore pass by it; consequently, the title remains as it was before the treaty; that is to say, the lands
reserved are still held under the original Indian title." 175 U.S. at 12. See also
Gaines v. Nicholson, 50 U.S. 379, 388, 9 How. 356, 364 (1850). (Justice Nelson,
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the Supreme Court considered the nature of Indian property rights
by reservation. The Court considered whether the treaty conveyed
rights or recognized rights, and concluded that the treaty operated
to pass a fee simple title to the reservee. 20 These cases, however,
may be of limited relevance to treaty conveyances to foreign nations because of the unique nature of Indian treaties.' Until the
instant case, the question of whether the property clause precludes
the transfer of United States property to a foreign nation by means
of a self-executing treaty had never been addressed.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, without deciding jurisdictional issues, 22 the
court of appeals determined that the property clause does not prohibit the transfer of United States property to foreign nations
through self-executing treaties. The court determined that the
wording of the property clause, the history of its drafting and ratification, the debates over the treaty clause at the Constitutional
in referring to a grant by reservation, stated that "it was so much carved out of
the Territory ceded, and remained to the Indian occupant, as he had never parted
with it. He holds, . . . not under the treaty of cession, but under his original title,
confirmed by the government in the act of agreeing to the reservation.")
20. See also Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233 (1906); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 211 (1872); United States v. Brooks, 51 U.S. 464, 10 How. 442 (1850);
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 240, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823).
21. This appears true although it has been recognized that the power to make
treaties with Indian tribes is constitutionally coextensive with the power to make
treaties with foreign nations. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242 (1872);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 350, 378, 6 Pet., 515, 557 (1832).
A rider to an 1871 Indian appropriation act provided that "No Indian nation
or tribe within the territory of the United States" would thereafter "be acknowledged . . . as an independent nation . . . with whom the United States may
contract by treaty." Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976)).
22. In addition to challenging Appellants' standing, Appellee argued that the
action was both premature and presented a nonjusticiable political question.
Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court determined,
however, that it would be appropriate to proceed directly to the merits after
noting that deciding only the jurisdictional issue could result in the present court,
or in the Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings either on
the merits or on jurisdictonal grounds. Id. The court also considered that the case
presented a pure question of law, with no need for fact development; that the
merits were completely against the parties asserting jurisdiction; that the judgment appealed from was based on only one of several asserted grounds of lack of
jurisdiction; and that time restraints were imposed by the immediacy of Senate
action. Id. at 1057.

480

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12.475

Convention and state ratifying conventions, case precedent, and
prior treaty practice support their holding. The court noted that
the property clause does not expressly grant exclusive power to
Congress and in this respect parallels article I, section 8 of the
Constitution. 23 Article I, section 8 enumerates powers granted to
Congress, many of which involve matters traditionally the subject
of treaties. 2 After contrasting the expressly exclusive grants of
authority to Congress with the property clause grant,25 the court
concluded that the property clause is not intended to restrict the
scope of the treaty clause, but is instead intended to permit Congress to accomplish through legislation that which may also be
accomplished by other means.2 The court stated that the history
and purpose of the property clause confirm this conclusion. 2 The
court also noted that the debates over the treaty clause at the
Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions even
more directly demonstrate the Framer's intent to permit the disposition of United States property by treaty without House ap2
provalY.
The court viewed the proposals of amendments that
would have placed restrictions upon treaties disposing of United
States territory as evidence that the Framers recognized that federal property could be disposed of by self-executing treaty.29 The
court stated that the rejection of these amendments and the adoption of a provision requiring a two-thirds vote for the passage of all
treaties clearly demonstrates the Framers' satisfaction with a supermajoritarian requirement in the Senate, rather than House
approval, to serve as a check upon the improvident cession of
United States territory." The court also contended that property
clause cases arising in the context of state-federal relations, which
23. Id. at 1057.
24. The court cited the regulation of commerce with foreign nations as the
most prominent example of a power granted to Congress which is commonly the
subject of treaties. Id. at 1058. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. 580 F.2d at 1058. The court noted that because of restrictive language used
in the granting clauses, the treaty power may not be used to appropriate money
or impose taxes. Id. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 provides that "No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law." Art. I, § 7, cl. 1 provides that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments as on other Bills."
26. 580 F.2d 1058.
27. Id. at 1059.
28. Id. at 1060.
29. Id. at 1060-61. See note 11 supra & accompanying text.
30. Id. at 1060.
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hold that congressional power under the property clause is unlimited, should be controlling with regard to state-federal questions. 3 '
According to the court, the cases approving treaty conveyances by
the federal government to Indian tribes upheld treaties that clearly
disposed of United States property interests.32 The court noted
that in addition to treaties with Indian tribes, there are many other
instances of self-executing treaties with foreign nations which cede
land or property assertedly owned by the United States.3 3 For these
reasons, the court affirmed dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds of failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted,
rather than on lack of jurisdiction.34
The dissent would have held that those provisions of the treaty
which dispose of property could not go into effect under the Constitution until approved by Congress. 35 Cases stating that the power
granted to Congress by the property clause is unlimited were cited
as recognizing that Congress has exclusive power to dispose of
United States property. 3 According to the dissent, a comparison
of the power to dispose of property with the appropriations and
taxing powers demonstrates that Congress has exclusive power to
dispose of federal property. 37 The dissent found no evidence that
the Framers intended that the powers to dispose of property and
appropriate money should be treated differently.3 8 In addition, the
dissent noted that it is significant that the power to declare war is
granted to Congress in terms similar to those of the property
35
clause, and that the United States cannot declare war by treaty.
The dissent disagreed with the 'conclusion that the power to dis31. Id. at 1061.
32. Id. at 1062-63.
33. Id. at 1063.
34. Id. at 1064.
35. Id. at 1065 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting). The dissent viewed the requirement that the House have a vote on the disposition of United States property as
not operating as a restriction on the treaty power, but rather as merely a matter
of ratification procedure. According to the dissent, treaties may still be entered
into by the President upon all subjects that are amenable to international agreement, and to become effective, the treaty provisions must be ratified by twothirds of the Senate. But if any treaty attempts to dispose of United States
property, and is ratified by the Senate, article IV still requires the concurrence
of the House to carry out the obligations by the enactment of legislaton. Id.
36. Id. at 1067-68.
37. Id. at 1069.
38. Id. at 1071.
39. Id. at 1070. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 159-60
(1965).
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pose of property must be concurrent, stating that the property
clause does not use exclusive terms and is located in article IV,
which deals with state-federal relations." The dissent stressed that
by naming the specific branch which was to exercise the power, the
Framers went further than necessary to define the relation between
the states and the federal government.4 ' Also, the dissent noted
that the specific grant of the power to Congress implicitly operates
to deny that the power vests elsewhere. 2 The dissent argued that
both established state department procedures"' and past treaty
practices4" support its conclusion. Also, the dissent asserted that
the rejection by the Framers of amendments to the proposed treaty
clause with respect to territorial rights does not support the court's
40. 580 F.2d at 1076.
41. Id. at 1077.
42.

Id.

43. See DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANuAL § 700 et seq. (Oct. 25,
1974).
44. The dissent analyzed the following eleven treaties which had been offered
by Appellee in support of its contention that United States property had frequently been disposed of by self-executing treaties: Treaty with the Cherokees,
Dec. 29, 1835, United States-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478; Treaty with the Chippewa Indians, Oct. 2, 1863, United States-The Redlake and Pembina Bands of
Chippewa Indians, 13 Stat. 667; Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb.
22, 1819, United States-Spain, 8 Stat. 252; Webster-Asburton Treaty, Aug. 9,
1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572; Treaty with Great Britain, June
15, 1846, United States-Great Britain, 9 Stat. 869; Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 1,
1933, United States-Mexico, 48 Stat. 1621, T.S. No. 861; Convention on the
Problem of the Chamizal, Aug. 29, 1963, United States-Mexico, 15 U.S.T. 21,
T.I.A.S. No. 5515; Treaty Resolving Boundary Differences, Nov. 23, 1970, United
States-Mexico, 23 U.S.T. 371, T.I.A.S. No. 7313; Treaty on the Swan Islands,
Nov. 22, 1971, United States-Honduras, 23 U.S.T. 2630, T.I.A.S. No. 7453; Reversion to Japan of Islands, June 17, 1971, United States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 447,
T.I.A.S. No. 7314; and Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, Jan.
25, 1955, United States-Panama, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. 3297. The dissent noted
that the Indian treaties did not support Appellee's position because of their peculiar nature; that the treaties with Spain and Great Britain were inapplicable
because they merely settled boundary disputes; that two of the three treaties with
Mexico specifically recognized the need for congressional legislation and the third
implicitly recognized such a necessity; that the Honduras treaty involved very
minimal amounts of property; that the Japan treaty had statutory authority to
transfer surplus war property and otherwise merely relinquish our temporary right
of military occupation; and, the 1955 Panamanian treaty specifically recognized
that legislation by Congress was necessary for the transfer of United States property. Thus, the dissent concluded that none of the treaties provided substantial
support for Appellee's contention. 580 F.2d at 1094-99.
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RECENT DECISIONS

holding. 5 The dissent found no evidence that the proposers of the
amendments took cognizance of the property clause, or that the
majority rejected the amendments because it interpreted the property clause as prohibiting transfers of property by treaty.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant case is the first to consider whether the property
clause prohibits the transfer of United States property to foreign
nations through self-executing treaties. The Constitution does not
intimate whether the Framers intended the property clause to
grant exclusive power to Congress. 6 The court therefore argued
that the Founders must have intended the grant of power to be
concurrent. The selection of Congress to exercise the power to regulate and dispose of property could, however, imply an exclusion of
that power in other branches. The records of the Constitutional
Convention and state ratifying conventions also fail to clarify the
intent of the Founders. They do show at least some of the delegates
perceived that the treaty power encompasses the power to dispose
of property. The records do not indicate, however, that the amendments were rejected because the property clause would prohibit
property transfers by self-executing treaties. According to the
records, the primary, if not sole, purpose of the property clause
was to define state-federal relations in the disposition of United
States territory. 47 It would not have been necessary to grant
exclusive authority to Congress in order to achieve this objective.
For these reasons, the records do indicate, although by no means
conclusively, that the Framers intended that the treaty power encompass the power to dispose of federal property. Although there
is no definitive answer to the question presented in the instant
case, the effect of the court's holding is evident: the self-executing
treaty power may be used to convey United States property to a
foreign nation. Therefore, by means of the self-executing teaty
process the House of Representatives may be effectively precluded from participating in such dispositions.
A. Dale Wilson
45. 580 F.2d at 1089. For a discussion of the proposed amendments see note
11 supra & accompanying text.
46. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
47. See note 11 supra & accompanying text.

